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ABSTRACT 
In today’s Information Age, a nation’s dependence on 
cyberspace is becoming an increasingly important aspect of 
national security.  As technology has improved, and more 
sectors of critical national infrastructure are 
interconnected in cyberspace, the level of risk to national 
security has increased dramatically.  Neither security 
policies nor international laws have been able to keep up 
with the demands of the rapidly evolving cybersphere.  
Nations need to examine ways to influence their adversaries 
against attacking critical infrastructure via cyberspace.  
Deterrence concepts and policies need to evolve to a level 
that can be applied to various actors, from the state to 
the non-state level.  The cost of entry to employ 
cyberspace capabilities is extremely low compared to what 
it takes to establish conventional or nuclear forces.  If 
the Estonia and Georgia cyber attacks of 2007 and 2008 have 
taught us anything, it is that highly networked nations can 
be vulnerable to cyber attacks.  If a significant 
investment is made in successful deterrence strategies, the 
outlook for adopting a fully networked society may not seem 
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...technologies are morally neutral until we 
apply them.  It's only when we use them for good 
or for evil that they become good or evil. 
 — William Gibson 
A. FOUNDATIONS OF CYBER DETERRENCE 
Weapon innovations such as tanks, airplanes, and 
nuclear weapons have revolutionized the way warfare has 
been waged during the past century.  Over the past two 
decades, the world has seen a new emerging weapon system — 
networked computers.  Computers may seem a bit out of place 
among the list of kinetic weapons that have been 
historically responsible for massive destruction and 
countless deaths.  However, the non-kinetic power that 
results from the use of computer viruses, worms, and denial 
of service attacks has caught the attention of both nations 
and businesses that rely on cyberspace to remain connected 
to the world market.   
Cyberspace was founded on the principles of 
establishing a free and open society for the sharing and 
collaboration of information to all those who wanted it 
(Leiner et al., 2003; Lipson, 2002, p. 13).  As more 
computers were networked in cyberspace, products and 
resources were developed that could be used by consumers to 
make lives easier.  Banks and companies incorporated 
services for people to manage their money, pay bills, and 
shop for items from home.  In addition to commerce, people 
were now able research information, read books or articles, 
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and share thoughts with one another.  Finally, companies 
found ways to network their worldwide services via 
cyberspace, not only allowing them to manage information, 
but also to control portions of their infrastructure 
through commands issued to machinery in remote locations. 
So, how can computer systems, which operate in a 
virtual, electronic realm actually be classified as weapon 
systems?  A weapon is defined as a tool used in “...attack 
or defense in combat for the purpose of subduing enemy 
personnel, or to destroy enemy weapons, equipment and 
defensive structures through application of force” 
(“Weapon,” 2008).  In general, weapons can be defined as 
the simplest mechanisms that use leverage to multiply force 
to deny, degrade, or destroy specified targets.  More 
recently, development of non-lethal weapon systems has been 
adopted for use, and designed to incapacitate and reduce 
collateral damage to property and the environment.  As seen 
in some cyber attacks, networked computers can deny, 
degrade, and even destroy their specified targets.  Denial 
of service attacks can deny access to certain cyber systems 
and degrade communications nodes.  Additionally, the 
Department of Homeland Security video of a cyber attack on 
a networked power generator illustrated how these attacks 
could physically destroy a piece of infrastructure.   
Cyberspace is an enabling factor for computer systems 
to achieve their effects as a weapon.  Although there is 
still discussion on how cyberspace is specifically defined, 
it is generally characterized as a man-made, virtual 
environment, without international boundaries, and designed 
for the creation, transmittal, and use of information in a 
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variety of formats (Rattray, 2001, p. 65).  As a society in 
today’s Information Age, it is difficult to imagine a world 
without cyberspace; however, those who initially developed 
computer systems in the 1950s may not have imagined a 
worldwide network of computers being used to deliver 
kinetic and non-kinetic attacks against an adversary.  
However, the threat is real and nations must develop 
strategies to deter cyber attacks on their critical 
infrastructure before adversaries can seriously affect 
their security. 
In today’s post Cold War era, a national policy of 
traditional nuclear deterrence is a strategy that needs 
revision to fit the present Information Age.  If the old 
nuclear deterrent depended on the frightful force of mass 
destruction, the new digital strategy needs to win the 
total information war (Der Derian, 1994).  A nation’s 
security can benefit greatly from policies that secure its 
dependence on information technology from adversarial 
exploitation.  Nations need a cyber deterrence strategy 
that allows them to tailor their strategies based on actor-
specific models.  In order to build an effective deterrent 
against those operating in the cyberspace domain, offensive 
and defensive capabilities must be built and sustained to 
operate in the environment.  The purpose of this research 
is to examine the prospects of cyber deterrence as an 
effective means of reducing the threat of cyber attacks.   
Strategic deterrence in cyberspace will focus on 
deterring a nation’s adversaries from attacking its 
critical infrastructure, both civil and military.  If the 
information systems that control critical infrastructure 
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are compromised, it can impact national security and 
ultimately the lives of the populace (Lipson, 2002, p. 11).  
Because information systems are a vital part of the 
critical infrastructure of a nation, our way of life is 
potentially at risk if they are not adequately protected.  
Critical infrastructure refers to the physical and 
cyberspace-based systems essential to the minimum 
operations of the economy and the government.  The George 
Mason University School of Law Critical Infrastructure 
Protection Program1  defines critical infrastructure as 
“what drives all the necessary functions upon which society 
depends on.”  Critical infrastructures are complex and 
highly interdependent systems, networks, and assets that 
provide the services essential in our daily life.  They are 
currently organized into the following 17 critical 
infrastructure and key resource sectors:  
 
                                                 
1 More information on the GMU Critical Infrastructure Protection Program can 
be found at http://cipp.gmu.edu/cip 






• Commercial Nuclear 
Reactors, 
Materials & Waste 





• Emergency Services 
• Food & Agriculture  






• National Monuments 
and Icons 
• Public Health & 
Healthcare  
• Drinking Water & 
Wastewater 
Treatment Systems 
Although computers operate in a virtual environment, a 
computer attack through cyberspace can cause destruction, 
both in the virtual and physical environments.  There are 
approximately 550 million hosts connected to the Internet 
today (Internet Systems Consortium, 2008); furthermore, 
Figure 1 shows that the number of worldwide users has grown 
to approximately 1.6 billion users today.  With the 
tremendous growth in cyberspace the deterrent value of 
successfully tracking and tracing attackers is becoming 
increasingly vital to the survival of the Internet and the 
nations that depend on it (Lipson, 2002, p. 11).  
 
Figure 1.   Number of Worldwide Internet Users (From 
www.internetworldstats.com) 
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The age we live in is constantly evolving; the world 
is becoming globalized in nature and interconnected vis-à-
vis the Information Age.  Within the Information Age, we 
see there is a dire need to protect a nation’s critical 
infrastructure; otherwise, the next large-scale attack 
against a nation could occur through a coordinated cyber 
strike on the systems that control its infrastructure.  A 
well-coordinated hacker attack on systems that control 
nuclear power plants or hydroelectric dams could result in 
a devastating number of lives lost.  A successful strike 
could potentially kill hundreds of thousands of people and 
could cripple a nation’s stability.  Similarly, a cyber 
attack on a nation’s financial institutions could have a 
grave effect on its national economy and create unease in 
its national security (Cabana, 2000). 
Networked control systems are increasingly being 
discussed among cyber security experts, because these 
systems control the main portion of a nation’s critical 
infrastructure.  In October 1999, a hacker openly declared 
his intentions to release information on how to hack into 
power company networks and shut down the power grids of 30 
U.S. utility companies (Riptech, 2001).  Although many 
nations have seen occurrences of low-level cyber attacks on 
a daily basis, national leaders are concerned with the 
possibility of a major cyber attack (U.S. Department of 
Defense, 2008).  Strategies are currently being discussed 
with the hope of deterring those who seek to attack a 
nation via cyberspace.   
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B. CYBERSPACE AND THE FUTURE OF WARFARE 
The warning signs of terrorist attacks against a 
nation via cyberspace have been around for quite some time.  
But how can attacks by small, networked, non-state actors 
be effective against powerful nations, whose conventional 
and nuclear forces can not be matched on the battlefield?  
Are nations not prepared for and better defended against 
cyber attacks that could affect critical national 
infrastructure?   
It is likely that some nation’s adversaries would like 
nothing more than to launch a cyber attack that cripples 
the nation and its citizens.  Following the terrorist 
attacks on September 11th, the United States launched many 
initiatives to deter future physical attacks within its 
borders.  However, the growing dependence on technology, 
networked within the public, private, and government 
sectors of a nation has created vulnerabilities to cyber 
attacks that could turn out to be a nation’s Achilles' heel 
(Goodin, 2008a; Goodin, 2008c; Iverson, 2004; Leyden, 2008; 
Meserve, 2007; Meserve, 2008).   
Even though some cyber security experts feel many 
actors, both state and non-state, currently lack the 
capability to launch and sustain massive cyber attacks 
against an adversary’s critical infrastructure, they may 
not lack this capability for long (Greenemeier, 2007).  
Some believe that an attack large enough in scale to cause 
mass disruption in critical infrastructure systems requires 
at least two to four years to develop the tools and another 
six to ten years to coordinate and prepare for the cyber 
attack (Wilson, 2008, p. 18). 
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During a speech to the United States Naval Academy 
graduating class in May 1998, President Bill Clinton stated 
that “our foes have extended the fields of battle from the 
physical space to cyberspace....these adversaries may 
attempt cyber attacks against our critical military systems 
and our economic base” (Newsbytes News Network, 1998).  
This recognition by a world leader reveals that vigilance 
should be practiced over a nation’s cyber infrastructure, 
as cyberspace has become a new avenue to launch attacks 
from anywhere on the face of the earth.  The issue here is 
that many countries have been complacent about protecting 
their information infrastructure (The Economist, 2007b).  
The exponential technological growth and low cost of 
entry to operate within cyberspace have created a domain 
where state and non-state actors, including terrorist 
organizations, can safely hide in the shadows of anonymity 
that cyberspace provides.  Cyberspace is proving to be a 
powerful arena to recruit, train, and equip new hackers, as 
well as to coordinate and launch cyber attacks (Allard, 
2006).   
C. DEFINING CYBER ATTACKS AND CYBER WARFARE 
Before progressing too deeply into exploring the 
concept of cyber deterrence, it is worth noting that this 
research is not looking to deter every type of cyber attack 
that exists.  For example, it is impractical to say that a 
nation is looking to deter hackers from penetrating and 
defacing websites.  However, it is important to understand 




situations provide those defending the networks with 
further understanding of vulnerabilities that must be 
fixed.   
Computer network attacks, also referred to as cyber 
attacks, are a component of the information operations 
spectrum.   Cyber attacks are “operations to disrupt, deny, 
degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and 
computer networks, or the computers and networks 
themselves” (Schmitt, 2002, p. 367).  The core of cyber 
attacks is that a data stream is relied on to execute the 
attack.  Therefore, the means used set cyber attacks apart 
from other forms of information operations.  These means 
vary widely; they include gaining access to systems to 
acquire control over them, spreading viruses to destroy or 
manipulate data, using logic bombs that sit idle in a 
system until triggered on the occasion of a particular 
occurrence or at a set time, inserting worms that replicate 
upon entry into a system and thereby overload the network, 
and employing sniffers to observe and/or steal data 
(Schmitt, 2002, p. 367).  Like many attacks, there are 
often mitigation efforts to fix security vulnerabilities or 
deny attacks, although sometimes they are accomplished 
reactively as opposed to proactively. 
Typically, the image cyber warfare brings to mind is 
one of generally bloodless attacks that remain in the cyber 
domain.  While some of the basic outcomes of cyber attacks 
have been looked at as solely virtual thus far, ultimately 
what takes place in a cyber war may have consequences in 




Prior to examining different tactics of cyber 
deterrence, there is a need to introduce the reader to the 
concept of cyber deterrence.  This will acquaint the reader 
with its characteristics and will lay the foundation for 
discussing the application of cyber deterrence methods.  
This thesis will take a heuristic approach to the 
feasibility of a nation applying strategic deterrence 
concepts to the cyberspace domain.  The ability to deploy 
successful cyber deterrence strategies may help a 
technologically reliant nation avoid becoming crippled from 
cyber attacks by other actors. 
The second chapter on the evolution of strategic 
deterrence, which examines the methodology and theory 
through existing literature, is designed to serve a dual 
purpose.  First, it will introduce the reader to the 
concept of deterrence, its characteristics as well as its 
achievements and problems.  Some of these characteristics 
will be examined through a brief look at deterrence 
strategy as a part of a nation’s security policy.  
Subsequently, the chapter will suggest that an update to 
the concept of deterrence is needed to synchronize with the 
Information Age we live in today.  This will lay the 
foundation for discussing the concept of cyber deterrence 
later in this thesis.  
The third chapter will examine the emergent cyberspace 
threat.  This chapter will begin with defining the concept 
of cyberspace.  Furthermore, it will discuss the rising 
challenges and vulnerabilities nations face with their 
increased dependence on cyberspace.  This chapter will 
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discuss why strong offensive and defensive cyber 
capabilities are needed for nations that employ a large 
dependence on cyberspace. 
The fourth chapter will build on the analysis of 
deterrence and look heuristically at how deterrence 
strategies can be applied in cyberspace to lower the threat 
of a critical attack.  The beginning of this chapter will 
marry the two concepts discussed in the previous chapters 
into how the concept of cyber deterrence can be defined.   
Finally, the concluding chapter will broadly review 
the analysis of cyber deterrence and discuss its prospects.  
Furthermore, it will look at how cyber deterrence can be 
utilized within the national security policies of the 
United States.  A review of the United States’ National 
Strategy to Secure Cyberspace will be reviewed to see what 
policies are currently in place to defend United States its 
interests in cyberspace and to make recommendations for any 
changes that may be needed to include in its national 
security strategy.   
 12
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II. FUNDAMENTALS OF STRATEGIC DETERRENCE 
For to win one hundred victories in one hundred 
battles is not the acme of skill.  To subdue the 
enemy without fighting is the acme of skill. 
 — Sun Tzu, The Art of War 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Before we can begin to discuss how deterrence can be 
applied to cyberspace, it is essential to introduce the 
reader to the general concept of deterrence.  Understanding 
the concept of deterrence and how it has been applied 
acquaints the reader with deterrence characteristics as 
well as its achievements and problems.  Some of these 
characteristics will be examined through a brief historical 
look at the evolution of deterrence strategy as a part of a 
nation’s security policy.  Subsequently, this chapter will 
suggest that deterrence needs to be updated to synchronize 
with the Information Age we live in today.  This will lay 
the foundation of the future discussion on the concept of 
cyberspace-based deterrence.   
B. DEFINING DETERRENCE 
Deterrence is generally defined as influencing an 
opponent, either by denying potential gains or threatening 
the use of retaliation, in order to prevent the opponent 
from taking an action that you do not want him to take 
(Mearsheimer, 1983, p. 14; Morgan, 1977, p. 17).  The use 
of a deterrent strategy is an attempt to avoid the 
escalation of a conflict to the use of military force.  For 
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a deterrent to be successful, the threat must be at a level 
in which the opponent’s cost of taking action outweighs his 
benefits.  Furthermore, the threat must be one which is 
perceived as credible, therefore, the actor who is seeking 
to deter an opponent must show it has the capabilities and 
intent to follow through with the threat (Morgan, 1977, p. 
32; Huth, 1988, p. 4). 
In a simpler form, we can encapsulate the concept of 
deterrence by stating:   
Actor A desires to prevent Actor B from executing 
Z by denying or threatening actor B with X if it 
carries out Z   
While this is similar to one of the definitions 
Patrick Morgan (1977) examined in his book Deterrence: A 
Conceptual Analysis (p. 19), it differs in the fact that 
those we seek to deter today are not only state actors, but 
also non-state actors, such as terrorists.  Additionally, 
the introduction of the variable X represents applying a 
tailored threat response that is relevant to what the 
opponent values; further, X could imply the denial of its 
objectives through a defensive posture.  More will be 
discussed on the stratagem of a tailored response later. 
Furthermore, a nation typically employs the use of 
extended deterrence to protect its allies and vital 
interests from attack (Huth, 1988, pp. 1, 16).  The 
deterrence situation is considered extended if the defender 
is trying to deter an attack on a third nation rather than 
on itself.  For the analysis of strategic deterrence as it 
applies to national security, the use of extended 
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deterrence should be assumed to fall under any deterrent 
strategy studied and presented in this paper. 
C. FORMATION OF DETERRENCE STRATEGIES 
The use of deterrent strategies has been around in 
warfare for quite a while.  One classic example from 
Thucydides, described in his Peloponnesian War writings, 
involves instances where militaries sought advantages to 
entice their opponents away from starting or expanding a 
war, because the perceived risks were too great (George & 
Smoke, 1974, p. 12).  George and Smoke (1974) compare what 
we term today as deterrence to the notion of the balance of 
power (p. 14).  The actor who held the advantage in the 
balance of power often determined how the conflict would 
evolve.  Nations in conflict sought advantages over their 
opponents to tip the balance into their favor. 
Historically, militaries with strong defensive 
capabilities have had the advantage in land wars.  The 
nation with the defensive advantage was typically able to 
impose the threat of heavier losses on the invading forces 
(Quester, 1966, p. 3).  For this threat to effectively 
deter the aggressor, those leading the invading forces 
needed to perceive that the costs of attacking the target 
outweighed the benefits.   
Most of the deterrence theory we see today was born 
from the introduction of nuclear weapons and the emergence 
of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet 
Union (Sagan, 1991, p. 79).  In order to maintain effective 
deterrence over adversaries, the development and 
application of deterrent strategies follow a process based 
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on values, perceptions, capabilities, and actions of the 
aggressing actor and defending actor (George & Smoke, 1974, 
p. 97-103).  The Flow Chart shown in Figure 2 reviews the 
fundamental questions that need to be examined in the 
process of using deterrence. 
 
Figure 2.   Flow Chart of Questions on Deterrence (After 
George & Smoke, 1974, p. 102) 
 
D. THE UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES OF DETERRENCE 
When the offense has the advantage in a conflict, the 
balance of power is in the hands of the aggressor, and the 
prospects for peace are severely threatened (Quester, 1966, 
p. 4).  The ultimate rationale behind a nation utilizing 
deterrence is to shift that balance of power back in favor 
of the status quo.  Effective deterrence should been seen 
as both situation and application specific as we will 
examine below. 
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1. Two Deterrent Situations 
Patrick Morgan (1977) discusses two different 
situations in which deterrence strategy exists; the first 
situation examined is what he terms general deterrence.  
The other situation is what Morgan describes as immediate 
deterrence. 
a. General Deterrence  
Morgan describes general deterrence as being a 
situation representative of international politics.  
Applied in the context of general political and military 
rivalry where the potential for a conflict is present, 
however, neither opponent antagonizes the other towards an 
imminent military confrontation (Morgan, 1977, p. 40).  
General deterrence is classically observed as a national 
policy stance on a given issue that could last many years.  
For instance, throughout the early period of the Cold War, 
the United States policy promised a massive nuclear 
retaliation against the Soviet Union should the Soviets 
launch a nuclear first strike.  The United States 
recognized the threat behind the general policy would 
result in mutually assured destruction.  As the Cold War 
drew on, the general deterrence policy shifted from massive 
retaliation to more discriminate methods (Schelling, 1967, 
p. 190).  General deterrence should adapt to match the 
general environment in which a nation operates.  As the 
general security environment evolves, so should the general 
deterrence policies of a nation.  
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b. Immediate Deterrence  
Typically one practices and maintains general 
deterrence to avoid a situation that necessitates immediate 
deterrence (Morgan, 1977, p. 42). However, should a 
conflict escalate to a point where an aggressor is 
seriously considering launching an attack, then the use of 
immediate deterrence strategies is applied.  Furthermore, 
the actors who seek to deter must be aware of the looming 
threat and prepare their forces.  Immediate deterrence is 
based on understanding the aggressor’s intent to use his or 
her forces to achieve specified objectives.  An adversary 
merely having the capabilities to attack would fall under 
the realm of general deterrence (Morgan, 1977, p. 34). 
2. Deterrent Methods 
The level of defense (denial) and the strength of 
retaliation (punishment) play an enormous role in the 
ability to deter an aggressor from conducting attacks.  
Within the realm of deterrence, it is seen as essential to 
be ambiguous about the specific details of a response; 
however, the actor who is attempting to deter must make it 
clear that the retaliatory actions would have serious 
ramifications upon the aggressor if they carried through 
with the action (U.S. Strategic Command, 1995, p 5). 
Currently, the methods of deterrence on the 
battlefield are through conventional, nuclear, and, more 
recently, tailored means.  In John Mearsheimer’s book 
(1983) he states: 
There is a well known distinction between 
deterrence based on punishment, which involves 
 19
threatening to destroy large portions of an 
opponent’s population and industry, and 
deterrence based on denial, which requires 
convincing an opponent that he will not attain 
his goals on the battlefield. (pp. 14-15) 
Within the context of this statement, Mearsheimer argues 
that deterrence based on punishment has been historically 
associated with the use of nuclear weapons; whereas, 
deterrence through denial has been more typically coupled 
with the use of conventional forces.  The deterrence 
methods employed by militaries on the conventional 
battlefield have been around since the advent of warfare.  
As briefly mentioned earlier, the methodology applied in 
nuclear deterrence was born in the wake of World War II and 
the beginning of the Cold War. 
Until recently, nations like the United States often 
practiced a one-size-fits-all mentality when it came to 
developing deterrence strategies (U.S. Department of 
Defense, 2006, p. 49).   Unfortunately, this method is not 
suitable in a time when the security threat is constantly 
evolving; this is where the concept of tailored deterrence 
comes into being.  Each of the respective sections below 
will define and scrutinize the different methodologies in 
greater detail. 
a. Conventional Deterrence 
Conventional deterrence is based on threatening 
punishment or denying an aggressor his battlefield 
objectives through the use of conventional forces and 
weapons (Mearsheimer, 1983, p. 15).  In order to 
effectively apply conventional deterrence, the defenders 
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need to project to the aggressors that they can 
sufficiently defend the potential attack; furthermore, the 
aggressors need to perceive that the defenders’ retaliation 
would overcome their defenses and impose a significant 
cost.  Only then can conventional deterrence have a chance 
of being successful. 
Throughout time, nations have sought to develop 
new offensive and defensive military strategies or 
capabilities to employ on the battlefield and shift the 
balance of power to their favor.  Once a weapon system was 
introduced to the conventional battlefield and showed its 
value there, it became a war over which side could raise 
the most numbers, or the most advanced version, of a combat 
system into their arsenals.  Eventually, if the aggressors 
were able to shift the balance of power to their favor, the 
prospects of their being deterred from attacking would 
likely fail. 
During the Industrial Age, new offensive concepts 
and military weapons further eroded the expectations of 
successful conventional deterrence.  The advent of the 
airplane in 1903 and the introduction of armored tanks 
brought about revolutionary change in the strategies of 
warfare.  The introduction of air forces into conflicts 
brought with it a level of offensive weapons capabilities 
that severely disrupted the balance of power.  Offensive 
air firepower provided the military a capability to 
concentrate firepower and impose higher losses on a 
specified area.  Prior to this, those who occupied the 
defensive area traditionally held the advantage in a 
conflict.  The airplane shifted the balance of power to the 
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offense in battle (Quester, 1966, p 2-4).  Whoever went on 
the offensive first typically held the advantage.  Pre-
emptive strikes were the norm in conventional battles, even 
though no one actually desired war (Quester, 1966, p. 4-5).  
Another example of conventional deterrence 
failure occurred during World War II.  The Germans employed 
highly mobile and mechanized military doctrine, termed 
Blitzkrieg, in their use of armored warfare.  The overall 
theory of the doctrine promised a quick victory at a very 
low cost (Mearsheimer, 1983, p 58).  When aggressors 
believe that they can defeat their adversaries rapidly and 
decisively, deterrence is likely to fail (Mearsheimer, 
1983, p. 203).  The nature of warfare continued to evolve 
at the end of World War II.  After the United States 
developed and used the first, and second, atomic weapons on 
Japan, a threat of apocalyptic proportions emerged in 
military doctrine in the form of nuclear deterrence. 
b. Nuclear Deterrence 
The premise behind nuclear deterrence theory was 
to influence an adversary’s actions by means of threatening 
the very existence of its homeland with a punitive nuclear 
attack (Payne, 1996, p 6).  Nuclear weapons are purely 
offensive in nature.  Building a nuclear deterrent strategy 
was considered extremely revolutionary compared to the 
concept of a retaliatory attack through conventional 
deterrence.  The retaliation through the use of a nuclear 
weapon would come without the need to use conventional 
military forces first to defeat any defenses in place 
(Morgan, 1977, pg. 31).   
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The theory behind why nuclear deterrence has 
worked against those who do not possess nuclear 
capabilities is that it produces responsible behavior as a 
matter of self-preservation.  Although one could continue 
to improve anti-ballistic missile technology, which aims at 
denial deterrence, it has never guaranteed a perfect 
defense against nuclear missiles.  The cost of anything 
less than an infallible defense would be catastrophic in 
nature (Morgan, 1977, pp. 30-31).   
One illustration of nuclear deterrence occurred 
prior to Operation DESERT STORM in January 1991.  The 
United Stated conveyed a message that any use of weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) by Iraq on any Coalition forces 
would be met with swift and severe consequences (Russell & 
Wirtz, 2002).  The use of an ambiguous threat led many to 
believe that the United States would retaliate on a massive 
scale with nuclear weapons.   
When President George H. W. Bush was asked 
directly by the press if the United States would use WMD 
in-turn, the president stated that “it’s better to never 
say what you may be considering” (U.S. Strategic Command, 
1995, p. 7).  The rationale behind the ambiguity is that it 
makes the aggressor think very carefully as to whether the 
benefits of the attack are worth the potential risks.  In 
the case of nuclear retaliation, the consequences may be as 
high as the nation’s existence.  Although there has been 
speculation about whether this deterrent actually succeeded 




biological WMDs, one could argue the veiled threat was a 
success since WMDs were not utilized against coalition 
forces. 
Although this threat may have been credible at 
the time, subsequent information released by the leadership 
involved said Bush’s nuclear threat was nothing more than a 
bluff (Bunn, 2007, p. 6).  Unfortunately, by releasing this 
information to the public, should the United States leaders 
attempt to use nuclear deterrence again, their declaratory 
threats are much less credible in the eyes of their 
adversaries.  The deterrent threat of nuclear retaliation 
is waning, and new deterrence doctrine needs to be 
established to match the nation’s international deterrence 
policies with its operational capabilities. 
The use of nuclear weapons has its fair share of 
opponents around the world, who declare their use morally 
reprehensible because of the massive death and suffering 
they would cause.  Ethically, could the United States or 
any other world power actually bring itself to use these 
weapons if it became necessary to follow through on a 
threat?  If a nuclear nation truly wanted to use nuclear 
deterrence, doing so must be seen as morally acceptable to 
its own society in terms of retaliation (Bunn, 2007, p.7).  
Furthermore, it may be difficult to use nuclear weapons 
against an actor who does not have weapons of mass 
destruction. 
In a transcript released on September 12, 2008, 
the Honorable James Schlesinger, serving as the Chairman of 
the Task Force for Nuclear Weapons Management, stated “what 
has been the long-time practice during the Cold War and 
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subsequent years of developing the theory and doctrine of 
deterrence has more or less disappeared . . . the doctrine 
of deterrence has, to a large extent, been forgotten” (U.S. 
Department of Defense, 2008).  The time has come to shed 
the Cold War nuclear deterrence mentality and look at ways 
to apply deterrence to the multiple actors that threaten 
the world stage.  
c. Tailored Deterrence 
Tailored deterrence is a new term coined by the 
Bush Administration in its 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review 
(QDR); however, the aspects that make it up, tailoring 
capabilities to meet a specific challenge, tailoring 
messages that are situation dependent, and tailoring 
actions to specific actors have been around and evolving 
over the past decade (Bunn, 2007, p. 2).  The application 
and use of a tailored strategy truly turns deterrence into 
an art form.  The art is in developing a message that is 
actor specific and tied to specific situations.  Whereas 
nuclear deterrence was focused primarily on the punishment 
aspect of deterrence, tailored deterrence goes back to 
emphasizing the use of both denial and punishment (Bunn, 
2007, p. 2).  
To accomplish tailored deterrence, the 2006 QDR 
discusses applying a particular mix of the New Triad 
capabilities against specific challenges (Bunn, 2007, p. 
1).  The New Triad capabilities were described in the 2001 
Nuclear Posture Review report2 as being composed of 
                                                 
2 The 2001 NPR was classified overall; however, the unclassified foreword by 
Donald Rumsfeld was released to the public. 
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offensive strike systems – both nuclear and non-nuclear; 
defensive systems – both active and passive; and 
revitalized defensive infrastructure (Rumsfeld, 2001, p. 
1).  The use of the New Triad capabilities for tailored 
deterrence allows for the use of a mixture of nuclear and 
non-nuclear weapons, both kinetic and non-kinetic, and may 
help a nation meet the cyber challenges in today’s 
Information Age. 
Tailoring communications will allow a nation to 
focus the message of its intent to specific actors (Bunn, 
2007, p. 1).  The message that a nation seeks to spread in 
deterring an actor from specific actions may vary in 
peacetime and crisis situations.  The message conveyed 
during each of these situations would be a part of a 
nation’s general and immediate deterrent strategies. 
In the 2006 QDR, the declaration for the need of 
a wider range of non-kinetic strike capabilities calls upon 
the use of cyberspace as a means for future operations 
(U.S. Department of Defense, 2006, p. 49).  Within the 
realm of cyberspace, the Department of Defense (2006) 
recognizes that it needs to strengthen the coordination of 
defensive and offensive cyber missions (p. 51) to counter 
the growing threat to its national security within 
cyberspace.  Deterring actors from cyber attacks will be 
needed to meet the challenges in the face of the growing 
cyber threat. 
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III. THE GROWING CYBER THREAT 
The enemies of peace realize they cannot defeat 
us with traditional means.  So they are working 
on new forms of assault:  cyber attacks on our 
computer systems. 
      - President Bill Clinton, 19993   
A. THE CYBERSHOT HEARD ‘ROUND THE WORLD  
For more than three weeks in April and May 2007, the 
government of Estonia was the target of multiple computer 
network attacks in both its public and private sectors.  
The results of these attacks were briefly crippling, as 
much of the country’s critical infrastructure is integrated 
into its cyber infrastructure.  The reported origin of some 
of these attacks was Russian government servers, which led 
people to believe it was a state sponsored attack.  
However, further analysis showed that most of the attacks 
came from non-government servers in Russia and other 
countries (Landler & Markoff, 2007). 
In the assault, computer hackers used robotic cyber 
armies, termed Botnets4, to flood Estonian critical 
infrastructure nodes with so much data that they could no 
longer process their legitimate traffic.  The data load 
targeting these nodes was measured by security experts at 
                                                 
3 The White House Office of the Press Secretary, "Remarks by the President 
On Keeping America Secure For the 21st Century," January 22, 1999, 
www.whitehouse.gove/WH/new/htm1/19990122-7214.html, August 31, 1999. 
4 A Botnet is defined by Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Botnet) as 
a collection of software robots, or bots, that run autonomously and 
automatically often while hidden to the actual owner of the machine. They run 
on groups of computers compromised by hackers and controlled remotely. This 
term can also refer to the network of computers using distributed computing 
software. 
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90 megabits of data per second5 for 10 straight hours 
(Landler & Markoff, 2007).  This data stream cut off 
contact to online banking systems, online news agencies, 
and government communications.  What we have here is the 
first instance of an international cyber conflict. 
It is believed that these attacks stemmed from the 
removal of a World War II-era Soviet statue in an Estonian 
city plaza (The Economist, 2007a).  Who should be to blame 
for the attacks?  There was serious speculation that the 
Russian government was behind the attacks, because they 
appeared unwilling to quell them (Evron, 2008, p. 124).  
There were many early warning signs of the impending 
attacks on Estonia’s cyberspace infrastructure.  Russian-
language Internet forums had multiple posts with both basic 
instructions on how to carry out the attacks and target 
lists that maneuvered in reaction to Estonian defenses 
(Evron, 2008, p. 122-123).  
The anonymity that the Internet provides made it 
nearly impossible to tie the Russian government directly to 
the attacks.  In the analysis following the attacks, 
technical data seemed to confirm that at least one of the 
nodes in the attack was within the Russian government.  
This computer could have been a command and control node 
which initiated the attacks; however, it could have also 
been a spoofed IP address or compromised machine that was a 
part of the Botnet (Evron, 2008, p. 125).  While the 
Estonian government took rapid defensive action in attempt  
 
                                                 
5 The data rate of 90 megabits per second (Mbps) is the equivalent of 
downloading the entire Microsoft XP operating system every six seconds. 
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to thwart the attacks, will the Estonian government 
maintain a grudge over this attack and retaliate in the 
near future?   
If the cyber attacks were more organized and used 
viruses to target certain systems for destruction rather 
than denial of service, the attackers could have more 
seriously crippled the Estonian government.  If the 
attackers had found a way to manipulate critical 
infrastructure control systems, like power plants, dams, or 
transportation systems, the results could have cost many 
lives.  Governments need to be wary of cyberspace and the 
threat it poses.  If they continue to ignore the potential 
challenges that remain in cyberspace, these governments 
might just as well put a bull’s eye on their networked 
critical infrastructure.  This particular incident in 
Estonia may just be the beginning of future conflict in 
cyberspace.   
B. EXPLORING THE CYBER ENVIRONMENT 
In today’s cyber environment, security threats 
originate from a variety of actors with different 
motivations.  The threat is no longer solely on a state-
versus-state level, as the world has dramatically changed 
since the Cold War.  Since the Internet provides a basic, 
inexpensive, and relatively risk-free avenue to achieve 
effects that put national security in jeopardy, nations 
need to be cognizant of the various actors who exist and 
operate within cyberspace (Evron, 2008, p. 126).  In an 




threats, merely understanding the modus operandi of one 
type of actor will not establish models applicable to other 
actors.   
Furthermore, actors bring to the table their own 
motivations for pursuing offensive actions in cyberspace.  
A fall 2008 working group that examined the different 
levels of cyberspace analysis discussed a variety of things 
that may motivate different actors.  A few examples are 
that they enjoy the challenge, are curious, seek money, 
seek notoriety, are ideological, want revenge, want to 
coerce an opponent, are patriotic, seek to intimidate, and 
look to demonstrate their capabilities.   
Every actor brings their knowledge and motivation to 
the forefront when exploring and exploiting vulnerabilities 
in their intended target’s infrastructure.  As hackers look 
for new methods to exploit computer code, the 
vulnerabilities found within hardware and software 
platforms are plentiful.  Take the Microsoft Windows 
operating system as an example.  The number of lines of 
computer code in Windows is in the tens of millions; 
inevitably, techniques have been and will continue to be 
developed to exploit the flaws found in various software 
codes (Mitnick & Simon, 2006, p. 35-36).  
C. TRANSFORMATION TO THE INFORMATION AGE 
The world today is in the midst of a digital 
revolution, which is influencing the way many nations and 
corporations operate on a daily basis.  Over the past 
several years, the cyberspace threat has steadily increased 
to such a level that cyber dependent nations should be 
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cognizant of the danger.  It should come as no surprise 
that cyberspace has become a desired avenue for adversaries 
to attack, as countless vulnerabilities exist within 
cyberspace technology that can be exploited by those who 
understand them; further, cyber attacks can be launched by 
hackers from anywhere on the globe.  Cyberspace allows even 
small non-state actors, like terrorists, a chance to 
inflict damage against traditional superpowers.  This is a 
result of the lower cost of entry for adversaries who would 
be considered weak or non-existent with regard to 
conventional or nuclear capabilities (Zanini & Edwards, 
2001, p. 48).  This should be a cause for great concern 
among state actors. 
Although the Estonia cyber attack was dealt with 
swiftly and the effects were limited, a lesson learned in 
the aftermath is that a nation’s cyberspace infrastructure 
can be targeted by its adversaries as a center of gravity.  
Degrading or preventing access to the Internet can wreak 
havoc on a nation and undermine the trust the populace 
exhibits in the system.   
An August 2005 computer security report conducted by 
IBM stated there were over 237 million worldwide cyber 
attacks reported in the first half of the year (Wilson, 
2008, p. 15).  This equates to an astounding average of 
more than 1.3 million daily cyber attacks on systems 
connected to the Internet.  The IBM report looked at 
attacks as an event, or set of events, deemed to be 
malicious and intended to cause damage.  Approximately 64 
percent of these cyber attacks were rather minute in scale 
and were nothing more than a nuisance; examples include 
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reconnaissance probes to detect vulnerabilities and web 
defacements (“IBM Report,” 2005).  Meanwhile, approximately 
36 percent of these attacks had the potential to cause 
severe damage to targeted systems by shutting down services 
(“IBM Report,” 2005).   
In 2003, cyber attacks cost worldwide businesses 
approximately $186 - $228 billion (Cashell et al., 2004, p. 
10-11).  The estimate for 2004 by British firm Mi2g was 
around $250 billion (Cashell et al., 2004, p. 10-11).  
Unless defenses improve, this figure will continue to 
increase as the spread of and dependence on technology and 
the sophistication of attacks increases.  From a national 
standpoint, governments should be worried by these figures 
and concerned about the security of their cyberspace 
infrastructure and the critical infrastructure nodes that 
ride on its backbone.  The only hope to reduce the overall 
cost, both financially and to national security, is to find 
a way to deter those staging the attacks.  
In 1998, President Bill Clinton launched two 
presidential directives in an attempt to secure the United 
States critical communications infrastructure from attacks 
(Newsbytes News Network, 1998).  Although these directives 
were launched approximately 10 years ago, it appears as if 
nothing much has been done to secure the nation’s 
cyberspace infrastructure.  The recent Comprehensive 
National Cybersecurity Initiative is a recent program 
underway that highlights national resources being invested 
in securing the nation’s cyberspace infrastructure. 
On December 7, 2005 the U.S. Air Force changed its 
overarching mission to “deliver sovereign options for the 
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defense of the United States of America and its global 
interests – to fly and fight in Air, Space, and 
Cyberspace.”  The main difference from its old mission was 
the addition of cyberspace as an area of defense for the 
United States and its global interests.  The impetus for 
the change is symbolic of how vital cyberspace has become 
to global powers.  The addition of cyberspace highlights 
the focus and appeal of maintaining our security in 
cyberspace from those wanting to do harm to a 
technologically advanced society.  The military needs to 
view computers as a weapons system operating in the cyber 
domain, much like fighter and bomber aircraft are weapons 
systems operating in the air domain, and assert that they 
must be treated as such. 
Although the United States, along with many other 
nations, is increasing its attention to securing 
cyberspace, it takes a good amount of time and money to 
develop robust offensive and defensive cyber capabilities.  
Up until the cyber attacks on the Estonian cyberspace 
infrastructure in 2007, governments typically felt that 
security against cyberwarfare meant keeping hackers out of 
important government computers (The Economist, 2007b).  
Much less thought had been given to protecting against a 
mass disruption from cyber attacks against the public 
infrastructure.  This leads us to develop a new arena in 
cyberspace for exploring the application of deterrence.  
Exercises and real events, like Moonlight Maze and Titan 
Rain, have proven that cyberspace is far from secure; 
however, these events have given the United States an 
opportunity to study the outcome and apply new methods of 
security.  Only time will tell if the current “efforts” to 
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thwart crippling cyber attacks on national critical 
infrastructure were too little, too late.   
D. VULNERABILITIES AND THE IMPACT ON NATIONAL SECURITY  
November 2, 2008, marked the 20-year anniversary of 
the first major attack on the Internet, the Morris worm 
(Lipson, 2002, p. 5; Marsan, 2008).  The worm disabled 
approximately ten percent of all Internet-connected 
systems, an estimated 60,000 machines at the time (Marsan, 
2008).  The effects of the Morris worm opened the eyes of 
those who were using the Internet to the fact that security 
needed to be taken more seriously.   
Although the damage from the Morris worm was minimal, 
the launch of an attack that large could be catastrophic 
today.  The effect of disabling ten percent of the nodes 
today would result in approximately 55 million nodes 
offline.  If every person of a cyber-dependent nation owned 
a computer and operated in cyberspace it would be roughly 
equivalent to the populations of the United Kingdom, Italy, 
or South Korea. 6  If an actor were to develop an attack 
that could concentrate on an adversary on a scale of 
magnitude like that of the Morris worm in 1988, the actor 
could severely impact many nations.   
1. Rise of the Botnet Militia  
One highly damaging attack tool that has seen 
increased growth over the past several years is the 
                                                 
6 According to Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_ 
population), retrieved November 8, 2008, the population of the United Kingdom 
is 61 million, Italy is 59 million, and South Korea is 48 million. 
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establishment of robotic networks, or botnets.  These 
networks are made up of computers that have been 
compromised with malicious code, typically unbeknownst to 
the owner of the machine, which can be controlled remotely 
from a command and control node through the Internet (Issa, 
2008, p. 1; Wilson, 2008, p. 5).  Figure 3 is a simple 
depiction of how a botnet operates. The “botmaster” or 
person who is responsible for distributing or controlling 
the bot program launches the malicious software that takes 
control of the victim’s machine.  Once this machine is 
infected it becomes a zombie under the control of the 
botmaster and sometimes even spreads to other machines, 
forming a network that appears hierarchical in nature 
(Wilson, 2008, p. 6).  The botnet then can be used for 
various purposes like forwarding spam, stealing personal 
information, or launching distributed denial of service 
attacks (DDoS). 
 
Figure 3.   Basic Botnet depiction (From Business Week) 
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Over the past five years, we have seen an astonishing 
increase in the number of machines infected by malicious 
software that has been tied to a botnet.  Figure 4 depicts 
the various viruses and worms launched that connected their 
victims’ machines to particular botnets.  Along the y-axis 
the growth represents the numbers of machines that were 
tied to the botnets.  Some machines have been infected when 
end-users opened malicious e-mail attachments.  Other 
techniques have found ways to compromise machines without 
the need for end-user actions.  These techniques can 
exploit vulnerabilities when a user visits websites running 
infectious code through cross-site scripting and iFrames 
(Bort, 2007).  
 
Figure 4.   Botnet evolution (From Issa, 2008, p. 2) 
 
Malicious software has created an opportunity for 
botmasters to rent out their cyber botnet mercenaries on 
the black market.  The criminal cyber element, coupled with 
the botnets, brings a level of sophistication to the 
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computer network attack arena.  It makes it easier for 
those who rent botnets to target their attacks without much 
computer knowledge.  One such botmaster supposedly made 
$100,000 from advertisers to infect machines he owned with 
malicious software (Wilson, 2008, p. 5).  While the 
criminal element is seemingly using botnets more for fraud, 
extortion, and spam (Wilson, 2008, p.6), nations need to be 
mindful of the potential use by terrorists or other actors 
to launch attacks on vulnerable critical infrastructure 
that may affect national security.   
If we examine Figure 5 and Figure 6 provided by the 
Shadowserver Organization,7 we see a trend in botnet 
activity from December 2005 until November 2008.  In the 
first figure we see that the number of command and control 
servers has doubled from approximately 1500 to 3000.  The 
more troubling figure is the latter, as it explores the 
number of active botnets out in the wild.  If we look at 
the trends we see an average of 250,000 to 500,000 active 
bots; however, there was a spike in the number between 
April to mid-June 2007 that hovered around 3 million active 
bots.  While the significant drop in numbers could have 
come from security patches to compromised machines, it is 
believed that there are a large number of inactive bots in 
hiding until the time is right, remaining hidden as long as 
possible so that the nodes are not compromised (Bort, 
2007).  
                                                 
7 Source: http://www.shadowserver.org, retrieved November 15, 2008. 
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Figure 5.   Number of Botnet C2 Servers, Dec ‘05 – Nov 
‘08 (From www.shadowserver.org) 
 
Figure 6.   Number of active Botnet nodes, Dec ‘05 – Nov 
‘08 (From www.shadowserver.org) 
 
As discussed in the Estonia example earlier, the use 
of botnets played a key role in degrading and denying 
information flow to portions of the country’s critical 
infrastructure.  Even more frightening is that the spike in 
nodes from April to mid-June, shown in Figure 6, coincided 
with the DDoS attacks on Estonia.  The spike in active 
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botnets may offer support that there are many inactive and 
hidden nodes waiting to launch attacks on unsuspecting 
targets.  This particular incident in Estonia provides 
evidence that the threats to national security from botnets 
are real.  A concentrated mass botnet DDoS on 
transportation systems, such as air traffic control 
networks, could disrupt command and control of aircraft in 
flight, putting aircraft at risk.  Another attack could 
cripple networked emergency service nodes, slowing or 
degrading responses to emergency situations and putting 
lives in jeopardy. 
2. Other Critical Vulnerabilities  
At the August 2008 Black Hat convention in Las Vegas, 
security expert Dan Kaminsky unveiled his team’s discovery 
of a serious Domain Name System (DNS) cache poisoning flaw.  
DNS is a critical function of the Internet which resolves 
web addresses, like www.cnn.com, into IP addresses, such as 
64.236.90.21.  To simplify it further, DNS is like the 
phone book for the internet. 
The DNS cache poisoning flaw allowed the attacker to 
add a DNS entry to a targeted server, which, if successful, 
could redirect a user to an alternate site with malicious 
intent.  This attack floods the targeted DNS server with 
multiple requests for a specific domain name with different 
variations – for instance xy36.yahoo.com, zb92.yahoo.com 
and so on – while the attacker attempts to respond to the 
given server with the random transaction number assigned 
(Goodin, 2008b).  This random transaction number, one of 
65,536 possible IDs, is used to thwart corruption of the 
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session.  Once the attacker responds back with a correct ID 
he can subvert the entry in the DNS server with the IP 
address of his or her choosing (Davis, 2008; Halley, 2008).   
Once this flaw is executed, the attacker can redirect 
traffic to a site that could install malicious software 
onto the victim’s machine or mirror the victim’s intended 
site.  The latter example could be especially problematic 
as the mirrored site could be set up to capture login and 
password information from the victims, otherwise known as 
“pharming.”  Pharming can be set up to appear legitimate to 
the end-user as the web address entered is legitimate, but 
since the DNS server was altered it redirects to the 
alternate IP address (Davis, 2008; Halley, 2008).  Pharming 
of login information may typically be focused on the 
criminal element for financial gain; however, this 
information could be used by an actor looking for 
administrator access to control and exploit pieces of the 
national critical infrastructure.   
E. THE NEED TO PREVENT A ‘DIGITAL PEARL HARBOR’  
Over the past decade, the media have been focusing on 
how vulnerabilities within cyberspace could be turned to 
affect national security.  Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) systems are being discussed by cyber 
security experts, because these systems are increasingly 
vulnerable to cyber attacks.  Since these systems are used 
to control the main portion of a nation’s critical 
infrastructure, the loosely secured systems pose a serious 
weakness to a nation.   
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Historically, threats to SCADA systems were mostly 
internal, resulting from accidents, acts by disgruntled 
employees, or other inappropriate employee activity 
(Iverson, 2004).  Analysts have seen that from 1982 to 2000 
approximately 70 percent of the problems came from insiders 
while the remaining 30 percent were from external sources.  
However, times are changing as the world is becoming ever 
more connected through the Internet.  The number of 
externally generated security incidents has jumped to 
approximately 70 percent in reports from 2001 to 2003 
(Iverson, 2004). 
SCADA control systems typically run two operating 
systems.  The first uses Windows or UNIX for the operator 
console.  The security on this system is role-based, 
determined by the employee’s position (Brown, 2002).  The 
second operating system is the actual control processor 
which responds to commands with changes to the physical 
infrastructure system.  This is the system a hacker would 
use to shut down a power grid or enter commands that could 
physically destroy the equipment.   
There is a great misconception that SCADA systems 
reside on a physically separate network (Riptech, 2001).  
This second operating system typically lacks security as it 
was originally designed to operate in isolation. Ideally, 
these systems should have been connected to the main 
control centers through private telecommunications links; 
however, this method was tremendously expensive and 
companies found a way to let the Internet carry the SCADA 
system information (Brown, 2002).   
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A May 2008 report addressed concerns that the 
infrastructure of the Tennessee Valley Authority, the 
United States’ largest public power company with over 9 
million customers, had multiple cyber vulnerabilities 
(Epstein, 2008; Goodin, 2008a; Meserve, 2008).  A quick 
look at the TVA public website, http://www.tva.gov, shows 
that the company maintains 3 nuclear power plants, 46 dams 
& reservoirs, and 18 fossil fuel power plants.  
Vulnerabilities like this are not specific to the United 
States.  In the United Kingdom, after recent targeted 
Trojan attacks, a warning was issued that cyber-terrorists 
were attempting to take out their national power grid 
(Leyden, 2008). 
In September 2008, SCADA attack code was released to 
the public by a penetration tester following the software 
vendor deflecting the severity of the exploit (Goodin, 
2008c).  This exploit would have allowed hackers to insert 
code into the system and given them authority to control 
the infrastructure of gas refineries.  While some could 
argue that the release of the attack code was to fix the 
flaw rather than instigate malicious intent, it did convey 
a great risk to that sector of the critical infrastructure.  
For those who believe that a cyber attack could not 
actually affect the physical infrastructure that controls 
critical national infrastructure, the United States 
Department of Homeland Security demonstrated a cyber attack 
on a test power generator that eventually destroyed the 
generator (Meserve, 2007). 
Since the Morris worm was first launched 20 years ago, 
we have seen an evolution of various actors and motivations 
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for cyber attacks.  Many of the early attacks involved 
individual hackers looking for challenges and notoriety as 
part of the hacking elite.  Over the past several years, 
the trend has shifted to individuals and small 
organizations that are more interested in the economic 
value these exploits bring.  Now, we are seeing warnings 
being raised, as nation-states and non-state actors may 
soon possess and utilize their cyber capabilities to affect 
national security through attacks that could significantly 
degrade portions of a nation’s critical infrastructure 
(Meserve, 2007; Epstein, 2008; Goodin, 2008a; Goodin, 
2008c).  These warnings expound the greater risk of cyber 
attacks by an adversary for more than just criminal 
economic motives.  Further, a successful attack on 
vulnerable critical infrastructure could lead to an effect 
of disastrous proportions. 
The level of sophistication and severity found in 
recent exploits has increased the level of risk associated 
in cyberspace.  Do these prospects sound alarming?  They 
should.  There is a dire need to prevent these attacks from 
being carried out by actors on critical infrastructure 







THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 45
IV. DETERRENCE STRATEGY IN CYBERSPACE 
Safeguarding our own cyber capabilities while 
engaging and disrupting our opponents’ 
capabilities is becoming the core of modern 
warfare. 
 - Michael W. Wynne 
A. PREVENTING CYBER ATTACKS THROUGH CYBER DETERRENCE 
The threats in cyberspace are real, and the stakes 
increase each passing day.  The hope to reduce the overall 
cost, both financially and to national security, is to find 
a way to eliminate or deter potential cyber terrorist 
attacks.  Although historically conventional and nuclear 
forms of aggression have been subject to traditional 
deterrent methods8 used by many nations, these methods are 
expensive, time consuming, and potentially too extreme to 
be employed against an adversary that may be no more than a 
small hacker group of non-state actors.   
In the information domain, where equal damage can be 
inflicted by individuals or nation-states with an infinite 
variety of motives, incentives, and notions of rationality, 
and in which attribution is an unsolved problem, 
traditional notions of deterrence need rethinking.  The 
past two chapters allowed us to look at the concept of 
deterrence and explore the ubiquitous threats found in 
                                                 
8 Traditional deterrent methods are conventional deterrence, which is more 
denial-based, and nuclear deterrence, which is more punitive-based.  
Conventional deterrence says that the United States will threaten to send the 
physical military forces and weapons to fight an adversary.  Nuclear deterrence 
is one that the United States says it will threaten to launch nuclear weapons 
against an adversary if they attack. 
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cyberspace.  These chapters allowed us to build a framework 
for analyzing how deterrence can be applied to the 
cyberspace environment.  In order to build an effective 
deterrent against actors operating in the cyber domain, 
offensive and defensive capabilities must be built and 
sustained to operate in the cyberspace environment.  These 
capabilities will be engaged to meet the challenges actors 
inflict upon the cyber domain.  
B. APPLYING PRINCIPLES OF DETERRENCE TO CYBERSPACE 
In Patrick Morgan’s (1977) book Deterrence: A 
Conceptual Analysis, he defined deterrence simply as the 
“calculated attempt to induce an adversary to do something, 
or refrain from doing something, by threatening a penalty 
for non-compliance” (p. 18).  The fundamentals of 
deterrence, denying the gains from an attack and 
threatening retaliation if attacked, will not change as 
technology and warfare evolve, but the stratagems used to 
employ the methodology will need to change to sustain its 
effectiveness.  Unfortunately, the practice of deterrence 
today remains in-line with the Cold War mentality.   
Taking from what Mearsheimer, Morgan, and all other 
strategists who studied deterrence wrote, we can apply core 
concepts to build the definition of cyber deterrence.  
Cyber deterrence is defined as influencing an actor, either 
by denying the potential gains of the actor or by 
threatening punishment through the use of retaliation, in 
order to prevent the actor from utilizing cyberspace as a 
means to degrade, disrupt, manipulate, deny, or destroy any 
portion of the critical national infrastructure. 
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Deterrent strategy attempts to keep a conflict from 
escalating to the use of military force, ironically, by 
means of threatening the use of force.  For deterrence to 
be successful, the threat must be at a level where the 
actor recognizes that the cost and risk of taking action 
outweighs the benefits.  Furthermore, the threat must be 
one that is perceived as credible, so the nation seeking to 
deter an opponent must show it has the capabilities and 
intent to follow through with the retaliatory threat 
(Morgan, 1977, p. 32). 
C. TAILORING DETERRENCE TO CYBERSPACE – ONE SIZE DOES NOT 
FIT ALL 
In Chapter III, we briefly explored the various actors 
and motivations that play a role in the cyber domain.  
Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a shift in 
the environment which now requires a nation to broaden its 
strategic deterrence towards a more adaptable approach 
(Bunn, 2007, p. 1).  Ms. Bunn wrote that although the 
vision for the new environment emerged in official United 
States’ documents in 1995, the term tailored deterrence was 
not developed until the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review 
Report (Bunn, 2007, p. 2).  Prior to this shift, the United 
States typically applied the same conventional and nuclear 
deterrence model to its adversaries.  This model was out of 
touch with the modern world environment. 
Patrick Morgan (1977) laid out the two fundamental 
different deterrence situations, general and immediate 
deterrence, which describe how a deterrent should be 
developed against threats to national security (pp. 25-43).  
Although Morgan may not have been aware of how effective 
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this would have been 30 years later, what he accomplished 
provided a tremendous framework for how a nation should 
build effective deterrence policies.  It is necessary to 
understand the rationale behind each situation as it 
applies to cyberspace.   
First, there is a need to have a policy in place that 
is universally applicable to all threats to national 
security in cyberspace (Gray, 2003, p. 450); this is the 
basis for a general cyber deterrence policy.  General 
deterrence relates to opponents who sustain offensive and 
defensive capabilities to regulate their relationship, even 
though neither is anywhere near mounting an attack (Morgan, 
1977, p. 28).   
In Chapter II, it was explained that immediate 
deterrence reflects a relationship between opposing actors 
when at least one side is seriously considering an attack, 
and the opposing side is mounting a threat of retaliation 
to prevent the attacks (Morgan, 1977, p. 28).  Immediate 
deterrence strategies are considered situation and actor 
dependent.  Strategies that work with one actor may not 
have the same effect on another actor.  Applying the 
context Morgan provides in his book suggests that in 
cyberspace there could be more than one given immediate 
deterrent strategy at a time.  In addition, due to the 
anonymous nature of cyberspace there is a level of unknown 
that permeates the environment.  This is an innate 
challenge that will be covered in further detail in  
Chapter V. 
For an effective immediate deterrent, there is a level 
of cultural intelligence needed to understand the attacker.  
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Comprehending the cultural characteristics of an aggressor 
is important, as it provides the basic understanding of 
what defines this type of actor (Inkson & Thomas, 2004, p. 
62).  The value gained from accurate cultural intelligence 
is that it allows for the development of immediate 
deterrent strategies, which could have greater impact on an 
actor.  Building effective cultural intelligence averts 
applying “mirror-imaging” techniques that could be futile.  
The basis of “mirror-imaging” is that a nation assumes its 
adversaries would act just the way the nation would act in 
a given situation (Lowenthal, 2003, p. 8).  A perfect 
example took place in 1941, when no United States leader 
would have believed that Japan would start a war with the 
United States due to the power gap between the two nations 
(Lowenthal, 2003, p. 8).  This gap in power was the very 
reason Japanese leaders believed that it needed to start a 
war sooner rather than later.  If United States’ leaders 
had effective cultural intelligence on the Japanese during 
this rising conflict, they may have built more convincing 
immediate deterrence strategies to prevent a Japanese 
attack. 
D. ELEMENTS OF DETERRENCE IN CYBERSPACE 
In order to develop capabilities to deter cyber 
attacks, four key elements are necessary: denial, 
punishment, thresholds, and a clearly articulated national 
policy.  While these elements are essential to cyber 
deterrence, there are still challenges that must be 
overcome to strengthen the deterrent effect.  These 
challenges will be explained in more detail in Chapter V.  
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1. Denial 
The concept of denial within cyberspace is critical to 
successful deterrence strategy.  Kenneth Watman, Dean 
Wilkening, et al. (1995) state the following: 
Deterrence by denial attempts to dissuade an 
adversary from attacking by convincing him that 
he cannot accomplish his political and military 
objectives with the use of force or that the 
probability of accomplishing his political 
objectives at an acceptable cost is very low. (p. 
16) 
For denial in cyberspace, the nation that is applying 
deterrence must first have strong defenses, able to prevent 
the benefits gained from cyber attacks, and demonstrate 
resiliency within its networks.   
The concept of defense in cyberspace often conjures 
the notion of establishing firewalls to protect the 
perimeters of a network from those outside the network who 
intend to do harm.  Firewalls are an important addition to 
network defense; however, they are not the end all 
solution, as they have weaknesses.  DDoS attacks against 
firewalls can easily be used to saturate the bandwidth of 
the intended target so that no legitimate information would 
be able to pass through the system.  Think of a firewall as 
similar to a medieval castle.  If one launches enough data 
at it, one will eventually be able to overwhelm the 
defenses.  Moreover, firewalls only recognize and repel 
what they are programmed to do.  Inevitably, there will be 
openings within the defenses to allow “legitimate” traffic 
to pass.  Skilled hackers have no problems penetrating the 
defenses of a firewall.  Hackers often utilize tools to 
determine the types of traffic that are allowed to pass 
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through and search for weaknesses in their design.  
Additionally, hackers can find legitimate computers 
internal to the network which may have exposed 
vulnerabilities.  The hackers can exploit the 
vulnerabilities within the networks as a way to bypass 
firewalls.   
The 2006 QDR suggested adopting a defense-in-depth 
planning approach to protect critical information from a 
nation’s adversaries (U.S. Department of Defense, 2006, p. 
51).  A defense-in-depth approach would layer network 
defenses, giving the defender more time to react and 
respond to the attacking adversary.  From a historical 
perspective, the defense-in-depth approach has been 
superior for the defender to combat a blitzkrieg attack 
from its adversaries (Mearsheimer, 1983, p. 49).  As seen 
in cases of cyberwarfare, one may view a computer network 
attack as a type of blitzkrieg strategy, a “bitskrieg”, 
employed through cyberspace.  Attacks are typically 
launched in such a way as to quickly penetrate any current 
cyber defenses in place, steal or manipulate data, place 
backdoors on the system, and leave.  A well-designed 
defense-in-depth network may slow cyber attacks down enough 
for security experts to shift defensive resources in 
response to attacks and prevent large-scale attacks. 
Next, resiliency of the network should be exhibited to 
thwart attempts by actors attacking the national critical 
infrastructure.  Resiliency can be maintained through 
scheduled backups, so that the critical information 
maintained within a system can be quickly restored after an 
attack.  Additionally, alternate data paths and alternate 
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equipment should be readily available to implement 
contingency plans during sustained attacks.  These devices 
and network paths can be kept offline until necessary.  
Some governments and/or organizations may already have 
contingency plans in place if their current cyberspace 
infrastructure becomes inaccessible.  Reliable backup 
provides extra redundancy to critical nodes in the 
infrastructure, which adds to the resiliency of its 
network.  The strength behind resiliency in regards to 
deterrence is that it drives the cost of a successful cyber 
attack up for an adversary to achieve his or her intended 
effects. 
Finally, nations should continue to develop and 
leverage tactics, techniques, and procedures from computer 
network attacks and computer network exploitation 
activities to improve overall network defense.  This means 
that a nation should use penetration testing to explore and 
find its own vulnerabilities before another actor can take 
action upon it.   
2. Develop and Demonstrate Overt Punishment 
Techniques 
Instituting denial via defense-in-depth and resiliency 
only presents the defensive portion of the New Triad in a 
tailored deterrence approach through cyberspace.  In order 
to build effective deterrent cyber forces, offensive 
capabilities are needed as well.  The second portion of an  
effective deterrent is that a nation will need to maintain 
means for holding attackers accountable for their actions – 
this is through punishment.  The punishment of attackers is 
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predicated on the ability of a nation being able to 
attribute the attacks to a specific actor. 
Punishment should not be leveraged solely through the 
use of cyberspace; a nation should consider punishment over 
a broad range of all the instruments of power, using 
diplomatic, informational, military, and/or economic means.  
The choice of which instrument of power a nation uses as 
its threat of retaliatory punishment would depend on the 
type of actor who launched the cyber attack.  This returns 
to the notion of tailoring the deterrent to specific actors 
and leveraging threats specific to what the adversary 
believes is important.  
Furthermore, a nation should continue to develop 
offensive capabilities in cyberspace so that it can 
effectively launch attacks against an actor in this realm.  
In some cases computer network attack tactics may be the 
only way to retaliate.  One such cyber offensive standoff 
weapon, discussed by Colonel Williamson, is a military 
botnet (2008).  Unlike traditional botnets that compromise 
worldwide computers, Williamson’s botnet would be comprised 
of military computers explicitly set up for this.  Although 
Williamson likened his approach to carpet bombing, his 
analogy seems a bit sloppy as a botnet would be more like 
precision guided munitions.   
Williamson’s notion of a nationalized botnet raises a 
question regarding Shadowserver’s botnet data observed 
earlier in Figure 6.  Their data showed an average of 
250,000 to 500,000 active bots from December 2007 until 
November 2008; however, there was a spike in the number 
from April to mid-June 2007 that soared to approximately 
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three million active bots.  In the same figure from July to 
September 2008 there was another small surge in active 
bots, although nowhere near the magnitude of the April to 
June surge.  This may correspond to another DDoS attack 
which occurred in August 2008 against several Georgia 
government websites that effectively took the sites offline 
(Danchev, 2008).  A frightening hypothetical question to 
consider is if these attacks against Estonia were actually 
state-sponsored through Russia, could Russia in fact have 
its own distributed botnet?  While some could argue that 
the use of unwitting computers from civilian non-combatants 
could violate the Law of Armed Conflict, distributed 
botnets are not officially considered militarized weapons.  
Further, if United States leaders were to write off the 
possibility of a nation state compromising international 
computers to form a nationalized botnet, they may fall into 
a trap of “mirror-imaging.”  Unfortunately, the question of 
a Russian national botnet may be difficult to answer, as 
the anonymity of the Internet may hide the true explanation 
for the botnet surge and corresponding attacks.   What 
should be considered is that there is a strong offensive 
cyber weapon hidden within the shadows of cyberspace.  The 
potential strength of a hidden massive botnet army 
increases the need for a nation to build better deterrence 
through denial. 
One issue in developing offensive capabilities in 
cyberspace centers on classification concerns.  A 
specialized tool or tactic may be classified due to the 
nature of an exploit that an actor may want to keep secret.  
This is logical enough since once specific details are 
released, then other actors may acquire the same offensive 
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capabilities, or actors may be able to take defensive 
actions to stop such an attack.  The notion of overt 
offensive capabilities should focus on the capacity to 
launch offensive attacks and the ability to demonstrate 
such attacks.  Even the nuclear weapon was developed in 
secrecy, but once it was developed the United States 
demonstrated its ability to effectively use the weapon.  
Further nuclear tests reiterated that the offensive 
capabilities could be replicated if needed.  The same 
should be done with regards to offensive cyberspace 
capabilities.  A perfect example was the 2007 video release 
of the Department of Homeland Security cyber attack on a 
power generator (Meserve, 2007).  While the methods that 
employed the attack were not publicly released, viewers 
could readily see how the executed cyber attacks physically 
destroyed the generator after several successful remote 
commands.  Publicizing successful tests of cyber attacks 
may demonstrate that a nation has the capabilities to 
launch offensive cyber attacks. 
3. Develop Thresholds 
Until a deterring party can focus tightly on setting 
priorities about the assets it desires to protect, and 
exposing noticeable actions to both protect and respond, it 
seems likely to be in a permanent defensive posture.  The 
concept of a threshold suggests that a nation’s leaders 
will develop criteria as to what would constitute a 
cyberspace attack that would trigger an offensive response 
to the action.  Without a strategy in place where 
thresholds are developed to measure a given attack, 
deterrence would not exist.   The nation can attempt to 
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understand its measures of tolerance through modeling and 
simulation scenarios.  The scenarios can provide data 
points for different outcomes – from there it would be up 
to a nation to classify the probable outcomes into its 
threshold levels.  A nation can build its deterrent 
strategies from the potential outcomes of cyber attacks.  A 
nation’s thresholds should not be public in nature as they 
would articulate what an actor may be able to get away 
with; however, a nation’s intent to respond to a given 
attack via cyberspace must be publicly known through its 
national security policy.   
4. Develop and Articulate National Policy 
In the case of cyber deterrence, the general cyber 
deterrent policy of a nation builds on the definition of 
cyber deterrence given earlier and explains how the nation 
plans on handling any threats.  While a successful cyber 
deterrent can be built by a nation that has overt offensive 
capabilities and strengthened cyber defenses, one cannot 
begin to deter without a clearly articulated policy.  
Without a clearly articulated message that is received by, 
relevant to, and understood by other actors, deterrence 
will likely fail (Bunn, 2007, pp. 6-7). 
At a fall 2008 workshop hosted by the National Defense 
University on Cyber Deterrence, there was debate as to 
whether a cyber deterrent policy should be explicit or 
ambiguous in nature.  The majority view was that the 
declaratory policy should be ambiguous in nature, similar 
to Israel’s obscure nuclear deterrent strategy.  An example 
of cyber deterrence policy could be that a nation perceives 
an attack via cyberspace directed towards any of its 
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components of critical infrastructure as an act of war.  A 
nation could further compare an attack in cyberspace to a 
kinetic attack on itself or its allies, and state that it 
will respond to that attack proportionately.  The policy 
should be worded in such a way that applies to all actors 
that threaten a nation’s security.  An ambiguous policy 
would keep actors guessing if their actions would generate 
a retaliatory response from the nation once attacked.  
However, an ambiguous threat can sometime lead to 
deterrence failure if the message is not received and 
understood by the adversary. 
E. APPLICATION OF CYBER DETERRENCE METHODS 
What must be remembered in deterrence is that, for the 
deterrent threat to be perceived as credible, the one who 
is seeking to deter must show it has the capabilities to 
deny the adversary its objectives and launch a successful 
counter-strike.  Although it may be possible to deter 
actors solely through denial, the lack of retaliatory 
responses can inhibit the prospects for successful cyber 
deterrence.  The defender must show its intentions to 
follow through with the threat of retaliation.  The 
deterrence concepts through denial and punitive actions are 
the basis of a valid deterrent in cyberspace.  The problem 
lies with the need to overtly show that an actor possesses 
some offensive and defensive cyber capabilities without 
showing its full hand.  Since many cyber capabilities might 
be used in a single shot capacity before being rendered 
ineffective, actors may use their tools solely in a covert 
or clandestine fashion.  Without making its intentions and 
a few of its capabilities known to the aggressor, the 
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aggressor may not accurately perceive the message and cyber 
deterrence would fail. Furthermore, the deterrent threats 
issued by a nation must be morally acceptable to its own 
society, otherwise the deterrent will be perceived as 
worthless by the opposing actor (Bunn, 2007, p. 7). 
Once policies and thresholds are established, the 
nation will need to quickly determine the proportionality 
of response once attacked.  A nation should take great care 
to determine the level of response to prevent escalation of 
a conflict.  The response should be costly enough to the 
actor that he or she can rationalize that the cost of 
further attacks would outweigh the benefits.  Additionally, 
immediate deterrence must continue to be practiced to 
prevent further escalation.  There is a need to ensure the 
level of response does not reach a tipping point where the 
actor believes they have no choice other than to escalate.   
When asked how the concern of cyberwarfare towards 
national security could be implemented in an Air Force 
Strategic Command, the Honorable James Schlesinger stated 
“cyberwarfare is one of our serious problems and that it is 
– leads to the same kinds of considerations that one has 
with regard to nuclear deterrence – in this case, 
deterrence of cyberattacks” (U.S. Department of Defense, 
2008).  Many believe actors found within cyberspace are 
ramping up to sustain a battle fought asymmetrically.   If 
one reads the articles being published, one might think 
that doomsday is right around the corner.  The art of 
deterrence can be applied to alleviate the threats to 
national security.  To effectively build deterrence in 
cyberspace, a nation’s leaders need to understand the 
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fundamental principles, necessary elements, and essential 
processes; however, there are challenges that still need to 
be overcome.  These challenges will be discussed in further 
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V. THE PROSPECTS FOR CYBER DETERRENCE 
Some problems are so complex that you have to be 
highly intelligent and well informed just to be 
undecided about them. 
 — Laurence J. Peter 
A. CYBERSPACE CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
Cyber deterrence may prove to be a wicked problem – 
one that evolves as new solutions are considered and/or 
implemented (“Wicked Problems,” 2008).  As vulnerabilities 
are fixed in cyberspace or solutions are added to make 
cyberspace more secure, new problems are often created.  To 
surmount these challenges, further research and analysis 
should be undertaken.  The challenges in cyberspace are 
derived from technological limitations, policy and 
regulation issues, and the ripple effect of poorly 
understood changes. 
When the Internet began its modest life in 1969 as 
ARPANET, protocols were developed to ensure the 
survivability of the network.  However, security was 
simplistic and sometimes even non-existent (Lipson, 2002, 
p. 13-14; Mitnick & Simon, 2002, pp. 7-8).  As experts look 
back on the development of protocols now, this lack of 
attention to security is seen as a serious design flaw.  
Requirements to track and trace malicious actors across 
international borders may never have been envisioned 
(Lipson, 2002, p. 14).  Although this chapter addresses 
four challenges to cyber deterrence, these are not the only  
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ones.  As cyber security evolves, increasing security and 
building avenues to overcome these challenges, new 
challenges may emerge. 
1. Attribution  
The first challenge, attribution, is a serious concern 
when analyzing computer network attack operations.  The 
Internet provides a level of anonymity that makes it 
extremely difficult for defenders to understand who may be 
conducting cyber attacks.  While intrusion detection 
systems and other sensors may identify suspicious activity 
within a nation’s networks, it may be difficult to 
determine where this activity originates and what motivates 
it.  In real events like Titan Rain, cyber intelligence 
techniques have been able to trace the source back to a 
specific region of the world (Shannon & Thornburgh, 2005).  
However, it has been extremely difficult to determine who 
was behind the attack or even whether it was a nation-state 
or non-state actor.  The lack of attribution for cyber 
attacks significantly limits the prospects for precise 
retaliatory actions. 
The anonymity offered by the Internet allows attackers 
to conceal their locations.  Botmasters, for example, often 
use their international networks of computers to launch 
DDoS attacks on their intended targets.  The command and 
control nodes are typically computers that have been 
compromised.  This leaves a network of nodes separating, 
both physically and virtually, the botmaster from the 
immediate sources of attack.  The other methods of attack, 
described in Chapter I also offer elements of anonymity.  
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Cyber attack tools (computer programs) can be written and 
executed without revealing ownership of the “weapons.”  
While some networks require usernames and passwords to gain 
access, hackers are often able to circumvent the security 
through social engineering or the exploitation of software 
vulnerabilities.  The possibility of actors gaining access 
to a network under the auspices of another identity only 
adds to the difficulty of attributing cyber attacks to a 
specific actor. 
One recommendation for establishing better attribution 
of cyber attackers is to require stronger authentication. 
For authentication in cyberspace to work, the redevelopment 
of network protocols will need to incorporate global 
authentication features into the network address headers of 
IP packets.  This may assist in examining computer forensic 
evidence of malware as it spreads; the protocols could 
provide the route to the originating sender of the malware, 
identifying the specific person who launched it.   
Stronger authentication could implement security 
measures that incorporate methods of multi-factor 
authentication.  For example, many financial institutions, 
and even the Department of Defense, are incorporating two-
factor authentication into standard processes before users 
can enter their networks.  Two-factor authentication is 
based on using two of three security features to 
authenticate access to a system: something a user knows, 
such as a password; something a user has, like an 
information-embedded smart card or a token; and some 
characteristic of a user, namely a biometric (Mitnick & 
Simon, 2002, p. 84).  Three-factor authentication uses all 
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three factors (“Two-factor Authentication,” 2008).  Using 
three-factor authentication makes it even more difficult to 
repudiate a user’s identity.   
The difficulty in developing new infrastructure 
protocols is that they are often expensive to implement and 
many people may not support them due to the freedoms lost 
with this level of security.  Further, a major design 
overhaul of network protocols could take a while to 
implement.  While the cost of development and deployment 
may appear to be too high for some to support, the cost of 
compromised data or a loss of national security could be 
immeasurable depending on the system.  Additionally, the 
implementation of the new protocols could be difficult as 
multiple systems may have interoperability issues.  All too 
often solution platforms that are developed by different 
vendors are incompatible with one another and information 
from one set of systems will not pass information to 
others.  Incompatible security platforms can also increase 
costs by creating a need to find and build ways to bridge 
cyber security gaps.      
2. The Private Sector 
The private sector plays a vital role in national 
security as it owns most of the critical infrastructure of 
a nation.  Furthermore, the private sector also faces the 
challenge of developing stronger methods for security in 
cyberspace.  Most pieces of critical infrastructure are not 
owned by the government, but rather by private companies.  
Currently, with regards to cyber security, coordination is 
still lacking in some areas between the private sector and 
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the government.  Some initiatives, such as the George Mason 
University Critical Infrastructure Protection Program, seek 
to combine security research, inform critical communities, 
explore concepts, and develop solutions for protecting 
critical infrastructure systems.  However, to protect 
companies that are found within a nation’s critical 
infrastructure, national regulatory guidelines should be 
established. 
Depending on the regulations, it may be a challenge to 
get the private sector to adhere to regulatory guidelines 
for operating in a nation’s cyberspace infrastructure.  
However, it is in their best interest to get involved.  
Critical infrastructure protection is not only about 
national security, but also about the strength of a 
nation’s competitiveness in the world market.9  For example, 
at the 2008 National Defense University workshop on Cyber 
Deterrence, one panelist stated that the private industries 
operating within the United States’ national critical 
infrastructure contribute roughly $6 billon to the nation’s 
gross domestic product.  While the financial gains are 
critical for the government to be competitive in the world 
market, security in cyberspace should also be critical to 
the nation.   
Successful cyber attacks on any of the industries 
within the realm of critical infrastructure can severely 
jeopardize national security and the lives of a nation’s 
populace (Lipson, 2002, p. 11).  Furthermore, cyber 
                                                 
9 The notion of critical infrastructure protection being linked to a 
nation’s competitiveness in the global market was raised by panelists during a 
collaborative workshop on Cyber Deterrence at the National Defense University 
from October 20-21, 2008. 
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security is critical for the privatized industry’s 
survival.  If the United States government should learn one 
thing from the $700+ billion financial bailouts of 2008, it 
is that when trouble looms that can weaken the overall 
strength of a nation, private corporations affected will 
look upon the government to help save the day.  These 
financial bailouts challenge the perception that the 
private sector can self-regulate when needed.  While 
developing a system that is fully regulated by the 
government would create visions of a shift towards 
socialism, establishing guidelines for the critical private 
industry to follow may be a safe middle road. 
3. International Acceptance 
Cyberspace does not belong to any one nation; however, 
the physical infrastructure does.  Furthermore, the 
openness of information across borders has created 
vulnerabilities to national security.  While closing a 
nation’s cyber borders to foreign traffic for a significant 
time may reduce damages from a cyber attack, it could also 
arrest international trade and the nation’s economy.  While 
cyberspace laws exist within many countries, these laws 
typically cease to exist outside the borders.  The only 
cyberspace laws that exist in the international arena stem 
from nations that have treaties with one another.  
International laws and global standards that define 
acceptable international cyberspace behavior need to be 
established.   
One such avenue would be to expand the powers of the 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) to include 
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development of acceptable international cyberspace 
standards.  The ITU is made up of 191 nations and more than 
700 sector members and associates within industry.10  One 
recent initiative the ITU is examining is the concept of IP 
traceback (Rutkowski, 2008).  The overall concept calls for 
next generation networks to consider traceback methods to 
help law enforcement catch cyber criminals.  Regulations 
and initiatives stemming from a consortium with an 
international scope this broad may allow for greater 
international acceptance. 
4. Understanding Nth Order Effects 
As described in Chapter IV, cultural intelligence 
gives a nation an understanding of its adversaries.  A 
nation’s understanding of its adversaries and their 
weaknesses are the core for the nation’s retaliatory 
threats in its deterrence strategy.  However, when a nation 
employs retaliatory threats in its cyber deterrence 
strategy, the nation needs to ensure it understands the 
second, third, fourth, and Nth order effects.  For example, 
hacking back, or taking a demonstrative action that shuts 
down or damages computers or network links through which 
the cyber attack is routed, may or may not reach the 
attacking party in a timely manner; however, it could cause 
enormous collateral damage to non-adversaries or to one's 
own economy, society, or security.  This means that any 
action taken, whether it is kinetic or non-kinetic, can 
                                                 
10 These numbers come directly from the International Telecommunications 
Union website at http://www.itu.int, retrieved November 18, 2008. 
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have consequences outside the scope intended, thereby 
creating other concerns with which to deal.  
Since the negative consequences of an action may be 
greater than the benefits, the ability to understand Nth 
order effects of retaliatory responses to cyber attacks is 
critical to build effective cyber deterrence strategies.  
In this sense, the nation may stop itself from taking a 
particular course of action and select another course.  
Figure 7 contains a course of action process diagram that 
allows strategy planners to formulate offensive threats 
that can flush out unintended effects an action may cause.  
A nation may never know all the effects of an action, but 
the best it can do is to plan around the effects it can 
surmise. 
 
Figure 7.   Course of Action Process Diagram (After 
Miller, 2006, p. 37) 
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B. IMPLICATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY 
Although Estonia came away from their cyber conflict 
relatively unscathed, a good deal of attention should be 
paid to understanding the nature of these cyber attacks.  
Gadi Evron, an Israeli security expert who was brought in 
to analyze the aftermath of cyber attacks, suggested that 
governments need to ensure they have a plan in place to 
defend against a cyber assault.  The plan should have a 
clear chain of command and provide the authority to take 
certain steps (Nichols, 2008).  Evron’s rationale stemmed 
from his observation that the Estonian defense team lacked 
the authority to enforce its recommendations to the various 
government entities being attacked.  Additionally, Evron 
suggested that law enforcement needs better resources to 
cope with the growing cyber threat and greater 
collaboration needs to take place (Nichols, 2008).  
The ability of a nation to deter aggressors in 
cyberspace worked its way into the 2003 Unites States’ 
National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace.  While the document 
does not discuss the creation of a deterrence policy in 
cyberspace, the strategic objectives within the document 
are consistent with strengthening the denial aspect of a 
cyber deterrence strategy.  The overall U.S. strategic 
objectives for cyber security stated (p. viii) are as 
follows: 
• Prevent cyber attacks against America’s critical 
infrastructures 
• Reduce national vulnerability to cyber attacks 
• Minimize damage and recovery time from cyber 
attacks that do occur 
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The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace overtly informs 
the international audience that the United States takes the 
cyberspace threat seriously.  Although the National 
Strategy to Secure Cyberspace provides a sound foundation 
for defensive measures in cyberspace, further strategies 
are needed retaliate against actors who conduct cyber 
attacks against the nation. 
The United States has launched a classified program 
termed the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative.  
Department of Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff 
describes the work being done in this initiative as the 
Manhattan Project for the Information Age (Jackson, 2008).  
The initiative is a step in the right direction, as senior 
government leaders come to understand that the threats in 
the cyber world can be as serious as the threats in the 
physical world.  These threats need to be met with a 
strategy to deter attacks from occurring against the United 
States and its vital global interests. 
C. IS CYBER DETERRENCE ATTAINABLE? 
Throughout this analysis the fundamentals of strategic 
deterrence have been dissected, the growing threat in 
cyberspace discussed, and the rudimentary characteristics 
of cyber deterrence examined.  The ultimate question is 
whether cyber deterrence will work if a nation establishes 
national policies, thresholds for response, strengthened 
defenses, and overt punishment techniques.  While parts of 
the strategy can be successfully applied today, like 
stronger defenses, significantly more development is 
necessary before cyber deterrence can truly be effective. 
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First, a nation will need to determine what it 
considers a cyber attack.  Whatever a nation defines as its 
thresholds, should be kept secret.  The reason for this is 
that if a nation’s thresholds were public knowledge, 
attackers would knowingly get away with every cyber action 
up to the threshold level that defines an attack.  Public 
knowledge of a nation’s thresholds may actually increase 
attacks by actors attempting to operate just below them.  
Conversely, thresholds that are withheld from public 
knowledge may encourage a “try-and-see” mentality for 
aggressors to see what actions they may be able to get away 
with.  However, publishing thresholds for response may 
force a nation to respond which may be inappropriate when 
all circumstances of the cyber attack are taken into 
account.  A nation that does not respond to a specified 
cyber attack that met a publicized threshold would ruin its 
credibility.  While the idea of having publicized or 
secretive thresholds may be a double-edged sword, internal 
thresholds kept away from public knowledge may have a 
better deterrent effect by keeping the adversary guessing 
as to whether or not a nation will respond to cyber 
attacks.  The established internal thresholds are the 
foundation on which a nation’s decisions to respond and 
retaliate to a given cyber attack will be made.  Cyber 
deterrence policy will be based on a nation’s concept of 
its thresholds, the understanding of its ability to deny 
attacks, and the capacity to retaliate against a known 
attacker. 
Second, a nation will need to formally declare its 
policy to show that it will defend itself from or retaliate 
against the perpetrators of cyber attacks against the 
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nation’s critical infrastructure.  Without a policy in 
place, the nation does not have a clear means of 
communicating that it will respond to cyber attacks; 
therefore, the deterrent effect is non-existent.  While it 
was argued by some people at the 2008 National Defense 
University workshop on Cyber Deterrence that a national 
security policy on cyber deterrence needs to be explicitly 
clear in nature, the national security policy should be 
defined in an ambiguous manner.  The problem with an 
explicitly clear policy in response to cyber attacks is 
similar to the threshold issue.  A clear policy could give 
the attacker the advantage of building the response of a 
nation into his or her calculus for launching an attack.  
An example of an ambiguous policy by a nation could be that 
it states it will retaliate against all cyber attacks 
against its critical infrastructure, but the nation would 
not go into the thresholds of what it considers an attack 
nor will it describe its levels of response.  The advantage 
of a more ambiguous policy is that the attacker would have 
to fear more of the unknown.  The disadvantage of an 
ambiguous policy is that the attacker may misconstrue the 
signals and attack. 
In the aftermath of the Russo-Georgian War in August 
2008, some believed that attacks in cyberspace against the 
nation helped enable kinetic attacks by the Russian 
military in the region.  While there is no hard proof that 
Russia was behind these attacks, it is interesting to note 
that there are similarities between the Georgian attacks 
and those against Estonia.  Cyberspace has given 
adversaries the capacity to inhibit a technologically 
dependent nation’s ability to use cyberspace.  As actors 
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across the international spectrum are gearing up for 
conflict in cyberspace, stronger capabilities need to be 
instituted within international alliances.  Such actions 
must be accompanied by a revitalization of both NATO and 
the United States’ traditionally robust capacity to meet 
the threats in cyberspace.  Specifically, some recognize 
that NATO must improve capacity to conduct both offensive 
and defensive cyberwarfare operations to prepare for the 
future of warfare (O’Donnell & McNamara, 2008, p. 3).  In 
the aftermath of the Estonian cyber attacks, the nation 
called on Article 4 within the North Atlantic Treaty.11  
Article 4 of the treaty states that “the Parties will 
consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, 
the territorial integrity, political independence or 
security of any of the Parties is threatened” (“North 
Atlantic Treaty,” 1949).  It is possible that Article 4 
gave NATO allies an opportunity to analyze the attacks and 
prepare stronger defensive countermeasures for future 
conflicts of the same nature. 
In cyberspace, the threat is chronic, yet there has 
never been a major cyber attack that threatened the lives 
of a nation’s populace.  Hackers are lurking within the 
shadows, mapping the networks, building their cyber weapons 
caches, exploring their options, and perhaps patiently 
waiting for the most opportune times to strike.  Some of 
                                                 
11 This information was presented by panelists at the 2008 National Defense 
University workshop on Cyber Deterrence.  The panelists were discussing the 
aftermath of the Estonian conflict and said that since there was no precedent 
in cyberspace as the attacks being defined as an act of war, which would have 
triggered Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, it enacted Article 4 to 




the strength and adaptability shown in the Estonia attacks 
demonstrates that the actors are able to mass on a target 
and maneuver to circumvent defenses in place.  Much more 
work in overt offensive and defensive methodologies needs 
to be established before there can be successful deterrence 
in cyberspace.   
Greater emphasis needs to be put on strengthening the 
defenses for national critical infrastructure – this will 
bolster a nation’s ability to deter through denial.  Basic 
perimeter defense is not the answer; however, nations, like 
the United States, seem to depend on it (Defense Science 
Board, 2008, p. 19).  Some nations seem to be responding to 
the growing challenges in cyberspace and are allocating 
resources to develop better solutions.  The United States 
2009 fiscal budget allocates several billion dollars to the 
Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative to 
strengthen the nation’s defensive posture in cyberspace 
(Pincus, 2008).  Specific details are classified, but one 
would assume that the effort includes looking at security 
across all critical infrastructures. 
Finally, a nation needs to examine its options for 
establishing retaliatory threats in its cyber deterrence 
strategies.  Since there are a multitude of actors who 
could attack a nation in cyberspace, different retaliatory 
approaches are needed.  An attack by a nation-state should 
be handled differently than one by a group of ideological 
actors.  With nation-states there may be more retaliatory 
options; against another nation-state, a nation may apply a 
broader array of its instruments of power than against non-
state actors.  The confidence in deterring powerful nation-
 75
states with threats may likely be greater than in deterring 
other actors because nation-states are more likely to be 
risk-averse (Bunn, 2007, p.3).  Rogue states and non-state 
actors will be more difficult to deter as these actors may 
be more willing to take risks; however, a nation should 
attempt to deter them by understanding, and targeting its 
threats against, what these actors value (Bunn, 2007, p. 
3). 
Deterrence can be relatively successful when it 
affects an actor’s calculus for launching an attack.  
Deterrent strategies need to be perceived as legitimate and 
credible and applied in such a way that the costs of an act 
of aggression outweigh the benefits.  Until a nation is 
able to overcome the challenges in cyberspace, a nation 
will likely have to emphasize denial deterrence, because 
the veil of anonymity makes punitive deterrence extremely 
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